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Abstract. In this paper, a new chaotic pseudo-random number gen-
erator (PRNG) is proposed. It combines the well-known ISAAC and
XORshift generators with chaotic iterations. This PRNG possesses im-
portant properties of topological chaos and can successfully pass NIST
and TestU01 batteries of tests. This makes our generator suitable for
information security applications like cryptography. As an illustrative
example, an application in the field of watermarking is presented.
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1 Introduction
The extremely fast development of the Internet brings growing attention to in-
formation security issues. Among these issues, the conception of pseudo-random
number generators (PRNGs) plays an important role. Secure PRNGs which can
be easily implemented with simple software routines are desired. Due to the
finiteness of the set of machine numbers, the sequences generated by numerous
existing PRNGs are not actually random. For example, the use of stringent bat-
teries of tests allows us to determine whether these sequences are predictable.
Chaos theory plays an active role in the improvement of the quality of PRNGs
[5], [14]. The advantage of using chaos in this field lies in its disordered behavior
and its unpredictability.
This paper extends the study initiated in [3] and [17]. In [3], it is proven that
chaotic iterations (CIs), a suitable tool for fast computing iterative algorithms,
satisfy the topological chaotic property, as it is defined by Devaney [7]. In [17], the
chaotic behavior of CIs is exploited in order to obtain an unpredictable behavior
for a new PRNG. This generator is based on chaotic iterations and depends on
two other input sequences. These two sequences are generated by two logistic
maps. Our generator has successfully passed the NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology of the U.S. Government) battery of tests. However
it appeared that it is a slow generator and it can’t pass TestU01 because of
the input logistic maps. Moreover this logistic map has revealed serious security
lacks, which make it use inadequate for cryptographic applications [1]. That is
why, in this paper, we intend to develop a new fast PRNG. It will pass TestU01,
widely considered as the most comprehensive and stringent battery of tests.
This goal is achieved by using the ISAAC and XORshift maps in place of the
two logistic maps. Chaotic properties, statistical tests and security analysis [19]
allow us to consider that this generator has good pseudo-random characteristics
and is capable to withstand attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way: in Section 2, some
basic definitions concerning chaotic iterations and PRNGs are recalled. Then, the
generator based on discrete chaotic iterations is presented in Section 3. Section 4
is devoted to its security analysis. In Section 5, we show that the proposed PRNG
passes the TestU01 statistical tests. In Section 6 an application in the field of
watermarking is proposed. The paper ends by a conclusion and some discussions
about future work.
2 Basic recalls
This section is devoted to basic notations and terminologies in the fields of
chaotic iterations and PRNGs.
2.1 Notations
J1;NK → {1, 2, . . . , N}
Sn → the nth term of a sequence S = (S1, S2, . . .)
vi → the i
th component of a vector
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn)
fk → kth composition of a function f
strategy → a sequence which elements belong in J1;NK
S → the set of all strategies
⊕ → bitwise exclusive or
+ → the integer addition
≪ and≫→ the usual shift operators
2.2 Chaotic iterations
Definition 1. The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN be an “iteration”
function and S ∈ S be a chaotic strategy. Then, the so-called chaotic iterations
are defined by [16]
x0 ∈ BN,
∀n ∈ N∗, ∀i ∈ J1;NK, xn
i
=
{
xn−1
i
if Sn 6= i
f(xn−1)Sn if S
n = i.
(1)
In other words, at the nth iteration, only the Sn−th cell is “iterated”.
2.3 Input sequences
In [17], we have designed a PRNG which has successfully passed the NIST tests
suite. Unfortunately, this PRNG is too slow to pass the TestU01 battery of tests.
Our ancient PRNG which is called CI(Logistic, Logistic) PRNG is based on
chaotic iterations and uses logistic maps as input sequences. However, chaotic
systems like logistic maps work in the real numbers domain, and therefore a
transformation from real numbers into integers is needed. This process leads to
a degradation of the chaotic behavior of the generator and a lot of time wasted
during computations. Moreover, a recent study shows that the use of logistic
map for cryptographic applications is inadequate and must be discouraged [1].
Our purpose is then to design a new, faster, and more secure generator, which is
able to pass the TestU01 battery of tests. This is achieved by using some faster
PRNGs like ISAAC [9] and XORshift [13] as input sequences.
3 Design of CI(ISAAC,XORshift)
3.1 Chaotic iterations as PRNG
The novel generator is designed by the following process. Let N ∈ N∗,N > 2.
Some chaotic iterations are fulfilled to generate a sequence (xn)
n∈N
∈
(
B
N
)N
of boolean vectors: the successive states of the iterated system. Some of these
vectors are randomly extracted and their components constitute our pseudo-
random bit flow. Chaotic iterations are realized as follows. Initial state x0 ∈ BN
is a boolean vector taken as a seed and chaotic strategy (Sn)
n∈N
∈ J1,NKN is
constructed with XORshift. Lastly, iterate function f is the vectorial boolean
negation
f0 : (x1, ..., xN) ∈ B
N 7−→ (x1, ..., xN) ∈ B
N.
To sum up, at each iteration only Si-th component of state Xn is updated, as
follows
xni =


xn−1
i
if i 6= Si,
xn−1
i
if i = Si.
(2)
Finally, letM be a finite subset of N∗. Some xn are selected by a sequencemn as
the pseudo-random bit sequence of our generator. The sequence (mn)n∈N ∈ M
N
is computed with ISAAC. So, the generator returns the following values: the
components of xm
0
, followed by the components of xm
0
+m
1
, followed by the
components of xm
0
+m
1
+m
2
, etc. In other words, the generator returns the fol-
lowing bits:
x
m0
1 x
m0
2 x
m0
3 . . . x
m0
N
x
m0+m1
1 x
m0+m1
2 . . . x
m0+m1
N
x
m0+m1+m2
1 x
m0+m1+m2
2 . . .
or the following integers:
x
m0x
m0+m1x
m0+m1+m2 . . .
The basic design procedure of the novel generator is summed up in Table 1.
The internal state is x, the output array is r. a and b are those computed by
ISAAC and XORshift generators. Lastly, c and N are constants and M = {c,
c+1} (c > 3N is recommended).
Input: the internal state x
(x is an array of N 1-bit words)
Output: an array r of N 1-bit words
a← ISAAC();
m← a mod 2 + c
for i = 0, . . . ,m do
b← XORshift();
S ← b mod N;
xS ← xS;
end for
r ← x;
return r;
An arbitrary round of CI generator
Table 1. CI algorithms
3.2 Example
In this example, N = 5 and M = {4,5} are chosen for easy understanding.
The initial state of the system x0 can be seeded by the decimal part of the
current time. For example, the current time in seconds since the Epoch is
1237632934.484084, so t = 484084. x0 = t (mod 32) in binary digits, then
x0 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0). m and S can now be computed from ISAAC and XORshift:
– m = 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 5, 4,...
– S = 2, 4, 2, 2, 5, 1, 1, 5, 5, 3, 2, 3, 3,...
Chaotic iterations are done with initial state x0, vectorial logical negation f0
and strategy S. The result is presented in Table 3. Let us recall that sequence
m gives the states xn to return: x4, x4+5, x4+5+4, . . .
So, in this example, the generated binary digits are: 10100111101111110011...
Or the integers are: 20, 30, 31, 19...
3.3 Chaotic iterations and chaos
Generally the success of a PRNG depends, to a large extent, on the following cri-
teria: uniformity, independence, storage efficiency, and reproducibility. A chaotic
sequence may have these good pseudo-random criteria and also other chaotic
properties, such as: ergodicity, entropy, and expansivity. A chaotic sequence is
extremely sensitive to the initial states. That is, even a minute difference in the
initial state of the system can lead to enormous differences in the final state
Table 2. Application example
m : 4 5 4
S 2 4 2 2 5 1 1 5 5 3 2 3 3
In thisx0 x4 x9 x13
1 1
1
−→ 0
1
−→ 1 1 1
0
2
−→ 1
2
−→ 0
2
−→ 1 1 1
2
−→ 0 0
1 1 1
3
−→ 0
3
−→ 1
3
−→ 0 0
0
4
−→ 1 1 1 1
0 0
5
−→ 1
5
−→ 0
5
−→ 1 1 1
Binary Output: x01x
0
2x
0
3x
0
4x
0
5x
4
1x
4
2x
4
3x
4
4x
4
5x
9
1x
9
2x
9
3x
9
4x
9
5x
13
1 x
13
2 ... = 10100111101111110...
Integer Output: x0, x0, x4, x6, x8... = 20, 30, 31, 19...
even over fairly small timescales. Therefore, chaotic sequence well fits the re-
quirements of pseudo-random sequence. Contrary to ISAAC or XORshift, our
generator possesses these chaotic properties.
However, despite a huge number of papers published in the field of chaos-
based PRNGs, the impact of this research is rather marginal. This is due to
the following reasons: almost all PRNG algorithms using chaos are based on
dynamical systems defined on continuous sets (e.g., the set of real numbers). So
these generators are usually slow, require considerably more storage spaces, and
lose their chaotic properties during computations. These major problems restrict
their use as generators [10]. Moreover, even if the algorithm obtained by the in-
clusion of chaotic maps is itself chaotic, the implementation of this algorithm on
a machine can cause it lose its chaotic nature. This is due to the finite nature of
the machine numbers set.
In this paper we don’t simply integrate chaotic maps hoping that the imple-
mented algorithm remains chaotic. The PRNG algorithms we conceive are con-
stituted by discrete chaotic iterations that we mathematically proved in [3], that
produce topological chaos as defined by Devaney. In the same paper, we raised
the question of their implementation, proving in doing so that it is possible to
design a chaotic algorithm and a chaotic computer program. In conclusion, the
generator proposed in this paper does not inherit its chaotic properties from a
continuous real chaotic map, but from discrete chaotic iterations defined in Sec-
tion 2.2. As quoted above, it has been proven in [3] that chaotic iterations behave
as chaos, as it is defined by Devaney: they are regular, transitive and sensitive
to initial conditions. This famous definition of a chaotic behavior for a dynami-
cal system implies unpredictability, mixture, sensitivity and uniform repartition.
This allows the conception of a new generation of chaotic PRNGs. Because only
integers are manipulated in discrete chaotic iterations, the chaotic behavior of
the system is preserved during computations, and these computations are fast.
4 Security analysis
In this section a security analysis of the proposed generator is given.
4.1 Key space
The PRNG proposed in this document is based on discrete chaotic iterations. It
has an initial value x0 ∈ BN. Considering this set of initial values alone, the key
space size is equal to 2N. In addition, this PRNG combines digits of two other
PRNGs: ISAAC and XORshift. Let k1 and k2 be the key spaces of ISAAC and
XORshift. So the total key space size is close to 2N · k1 · k2. Finally, the impact
ofM must be taken into account. This leads to conclude that the key space size
is large enough to withstand attacks.
4.2 Key sensitivity
This PRNG is highly sensitive to the initial conditions. To illustrate this property
proved in [3], several initial values are put into the chaotic system. Let H be the
number of differences between the sequences obtained in this way. Suppose n is
the length of these sequences. Then the variance ratio P , defined by P = H/n,
is computed. The results are shown in Figure 1a (x axis is sequence lengths, y
axis is variance ratio P ). Variance ratios approach 0.50, which indicates that the
system is extremely sensitive to the initial conditions.
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Fig. 1. Security analysis
4.3 Uniform distribution
Figure 1b gives a 3D graphic representation of the distribution of a random
sequence obtained by our generator. The point cloud presents a uniform distri-
bution that tends to fill the complete 3D space, as expected for a random signal.
To obtain this cloud, we have first changed the binary sequence to aN -bit integer
sequence x1, x2, x3, x4... Then we have plot
(
x1
2N
, x2
2N
, x3
2N
)
,
(
x2
2N
, x3
2N
, x4
2N
)
...
5 TestU01 Statistical Test Results
In a previous section, we have shown that the proposed PRNG has strong chaotic
properties, as Devaney’s chaos. In particular, this generator is better than the
well-known XORshift and ISAAC, in the topological point of view. In addition
to being chaotic, we will show in this section that CI(ISAAC,XORshift) is better
than XORshift, and at least as good as ISAAC [18] in the statistical point of view.
Indeed, similarly to ISAAC and contrary to XORshift, CI(ISAAC,XORshift) can
pass the stringent Big Crush battery of tests included in TestU01. In addition,
our generator achieves to pass all the batteries included in TestU01. To our
best knowledge, this result has not been proven for ISAAC, and only one other
generator is capable of doing this [6]
5.1 TestU01
Indeed, the quality of a PRNG should be based on theoretical fundamentals but
should also be tested empirically. Various statistical tests are available in the
literature that test a given sequence for some level of computational indistin-
guishability. Major test suites for RNGs are TestU01 [11], the NIST suite [15],
and the DieHARD suites [12]. The DieHARD suites, which implement many clas-
sical RNG tests, have some drawbacks and limitations. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), in the United States, has implemented a test
suite (16 tests) for RNGs. It is geared mainly for the testing and certification
of RNGs used in cryptographic applications. TestU01 is extremely diverse in
implementing classical tests, cryptographic tests, new tests proposed in the lit-
erature, and original tests. In fact, it encompasses most of the other test suites.
The proposed PRNG has been tested using TestU01 for its statistical pseudo
randomness.
5.2 Batteries of tests
Table 3 lists seven batteries of tests in the TestU01 package. ”Standard” param-
eter in this Table refers to the built-in parameters of the battery. TestU01 suite
implements 518 tests and reports p−values. If a p−value is within [0.001, 0.999],
the associated test is a success. A p−value lying outside this boundary means
that its test has failed.
5.3 Analysis
In a sound theoretical basis, a PRNG based on discrete chaotic iterations (ICs)
is a composite generator which combines the features of two PRNGs. The first
generator constitutes the initial condition of the chaotic dynamical system. The
Table 3. TestU01 Statistical Test
Battery Parameters Statistics
Rabbit 32× 109 bits 40
Alphabit 32× 109 bits 17
Pseudo DieHARD Standard 126
FIPS 140 2 Standard 16
Small Crush Standard 15
Crush Standard 144
Big Crush Standard 160
second generator randomly chooses which outputs of the chaotic system must be
returned. The intention of this combination is to cumulate the effects of chaotic
and random behaviors, to improve the statistical and security properties relative
to each generator taken alone.
This PRNG based on discrete chaotic iterations may utilize any reasonable
RNG as inputs. For demonstration purposes, XORshift and ISAAC are adopted
here. The PRNG with these inputs can pass all of the performed tests.
6 Application example in digital watermarking
In this section, an application example is given in the field of digital watermark-
ing: a watermark is encrypted and embedded into a cover image using chaotic
iterations and our PRNG. The carrier image is the famous Lena, which is a 256
grayscale image, and the watermark is the 64× 64 pixels binary image depicted
in Fig.2d. Let us encrypt the watermark by using chaotic iterations. The initial
state x0 of the system is constituted by the watermark, considered as a boolean
vector. The iteration function is the vectorial logical negation f0. The PRNG
presented previously is used to obtain a sequence of integers lower than 4096,
which will constitute the chaotic strategy (Sk)k∈N. Thus, the encrypted water-
mark is the last boolean vector generated by the chaotic iterations. An example
of such an encryption, with 5000 iterations, is given in Fig.2e.
Let L be the 2563 booleans vector constituted by the three last bits of each
pixel of Lena. We define Uk by U0 = S0 and Un+1 = Sn+1+2×Un+n [mod 2563].
The watermarked Lena Iw is obtained from the original Lena Io, the three last
bits of which are replaced by the result of 642 chaotic iterations with initial state
L, and strategy Uk (see Fig.2b). Spatial domain embedding has been chosen
here for easy understanding, but this watermarking scheme can be adapted to
frequency domain (for an example of its use in DWT domain, see [2]). The
extraction of the watermark can be obtained in the same way [2]. Remark that
the map θ 7→ 2θ of the torus, which is the well-known dyadic transformation
(an example of topological chaos [7]), has been chosen to make (Uk)k6642 highly
sensitive to the chaotic encryption strategy.
a. Lena (scale 0.5) b. Watermarked Lena
c. Differences d. Watermark e. Encrypted
watermark
Fig. 2. Original and watermarked Lena
The robustness of this data hiding scheme through geometric and frequency
attacks has been studied in [2]. The chaos-security and stego-security are proven
in [8]. The difference with the scheme presented in these papers is the way to
generate strategies, i.e., the choice of the initial conditions for chaotic itera-
tions, in the encryption and embedding stages. This improvement does not alter
robustness and subspace-security. We have shown in this study that this re-
placement enhances the speed of the scheme. Moreover, it resolves a potential
security lack related to the use of a logistic map [1] when generating the strate-
gies: this lack might be exploited by an attacker in Watermark-Only-Attack
and Known-Message-Attack setups [4]. Instead of logistic map, our PRNG has
good statistical properties and can withstand such attacks. This claim will be
deepened in future work.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, the PRNG proposed in [17] is improved. This is achieved by using
the famous ISAAC and XORshift generators and by combining these compo-
nents with chaotic iterations. Thus we obtain a faster generator which satisfies
chaotic properties. In addition to passing the NIST tests suite, this new genera-
tor successfully passes all the stringent TestU01 battery of tests. The randomness
and disorder generated by this algorithm has been evaluated. It offers a suffi-
cient level of security for a whole range of applications in computer science. An
application example in the field of data hiding is finally given. In future work,
the comparison of different chaotic strategies will be explored and other iteration
functions will be studied. Finally, other applications in computer science security
field will be proposed, especially in cryptographic domains.
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